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Nepotism refers to the practice of giving preferential treatment to family members and is 
prohibited in some work organizations. Common anti-nepotism policies are often based 
on the unsubstantiated assumption that family relationships negatively affect 
performance. This study challenges this assumption with the hypothesis that family 
relationships improve team performance. The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is 
grounded in the literature examining team processes. Research suggests that coordination 
is an important team process, and that family members coordinate more effectively than 
non-family members. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that familial relationships in teams 
will lead to better – rather than worse team performance. To test this hypothesis, over 100 
years of performance data from 477 men's college basketball teams were analyzed. 
Results suggest that familial relationships in teams is positively related to better team 
performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Common anti-nepotism policies are based on the unsubstantiated assumption that 
familial relationships negatively affect certain group processes. This study will challenge 
this assumption and examine whether team performance is affected by familial 
relationships. The findings from this study will be used to address a fundamental question 
regarding nepotism in work organizations: Do nepotistic relationships in the workplace 
affect team performance? 
 
Nepotism 
Nepotism refers to the practice of giving preferential treatment to family 
members, and is prohibited in some work organizations. For example, many 
organizations (e.g. Pizza Hut, Wal-Mart, etc.) have policies that prohibit supervisor-
subordinate relationships between relatives, including spouses, parents, siblings and 
offspring. Similarly, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB Reports, 2012) has 
established policies prohibiting public officials from appointing, employing, promoting, 
or recommending family members. However, there are many examples in politics, 
entertainment, and sports where familial relationships are common and even accepted in 
work organizations (Bellow, 2003). Thus, nepotism does exist but it remains to be seen 
whether anti-nepotism policies are justified.  
Nepotism policies are essentially selection devices which have received little 
research attention. The legal issues surrounding the use of nepotism policies as selection 
devices have been highlighted on several occasions (Gutman, 2012; Jones et al., 2008). 
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Both policies that prohibit and promote nepotism have been tested in court cases 
(Gutman, 2012). In one such case, an anti-nepotism policy led to disparate treatment 
against women in an organization that prohibited spousal hiring (EEOC v. Rath Packing 
Company, 1986). Ultimately, the court reasoned that the organization’s anti-nepotism 
policies should have been based on the actual effects of nepotism and not perceptions 
(Gutman, 2012). Such cases provide examples of policies that act as troublesome, un-
validated selection devices (Jones et al., 2008). 
The potential problems associated with familial relationships in the workplace 
may have contributed to the creation of anti-nepotism policies. Nepotistic relationships 
may foster perceptions of injustice, increased stress, and decreased job satisfaction 
(Arsali & Tumer, 2008). Contrarily, some researchers have presented family-workplace 
relationships in a positive light. For instance, some research suggests the growing number 
of dual-career couples are benefiting from more positive work-life balance (Werbel & 
Hames, 1996). Other research suggests familial relationships may foster a more 
productive organizational culture (Dension, Lief, & Ward, 2004) and increase employee 
accountability (Gordon & Nicholson, 2008). In addition, the presence of familial 
relationships in organizations has been associated with increased commitment, cohesion, 
and longer-term orientation (Vallejo, 2008). There is also some evidence that perceptions 
of organizational fairness can both be enhanced (Woolsey, 2014; Laker & Williams, 
2003) and diminished (Darioly & Riggio, 2014) by perceived nepotism. 
While prior studies have examined perceived nepotism as a predictor of 
perceptions (e.g. commitment, satisfaction, justice), the present study will examine the 
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actual link between familial relationships and performance. This will provide 
organizational decision makers a further basis from which to consider nepotism policies. 
 
A Group Phenomenon 
 
Nepotism preferences rely on at least a dyadic interaction. So, by definition, 
nepotism is a group phenomenon. In order to understand the effects of nepotism on 
performance, we need to understand the effect it may have at the group level.  
While several definitions for work groups have been proposed, this study will 
adopt a definition which delineates the differences between task forces, crews, and teams. 
This distinction is based on tasks, tools, and members (Jones, Stevens, & Fischer, 1999). 
Task forces are defined by tasks, and typically disband when the defined tasks are 
completed. For example, governmental task forces have been formed to address natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks, and drug problems. The work of crews is defined by the tools 
used to accomplish tasks. In tank crews for instance (Tibbetts, 1995; Tziner & Vardi, 
1983), roles are defined by the machinery crew members use (i.e. loader, driver, gunner, 
spotter, tank commander). Crew members are interchangeable and their ongoing tasks are 
defined by the procedural tools used (Jones et al., 1999). Teams are denoted by complex 
interdependencies among members. Membership boundaries and tasks are carried out 
through the use of skills.  
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Group Processes 
 
There is a large body of literature examining factors that affect team performance. 
Two important factors are collaboration and coordination. Collaboration has been defined 
as individuals working together toward a common goal that is beyond what a single party 
can reach alone (Forest, 2003), and has been cited as one of the main contributors to the 
success of our species (Melis, 2013). Coordination, a form of organized collaboration, 
has been described as real-time behavioral processes unfolding as humans interact 
(Gorman, Amazeen, & Cooke, 2010; Kolbe & Boos, 2009). Coordination has also been 
described as the effective alignment and utilization of individual actions (Gulati, 
Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012) manifested as a shared understanding of behavioral 
cues that align each partner’s expectations (Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994). 
Research suggests that collaboration and coordination are important processes for 
understanding group performance. For instance, one study highlighted the criticality of 
effective collaboration and coordination within the context of military units (Salas, 
Cooke, and Gorman, 2010). A similar study suggests that the use of collaborative tools 
has a positive influence on team performance (Hidayanto & Setyady, 2014). Moreover, 
face-to-face collaboration facilitates development of shared mental models (Andres, 
2011), which generally enhance performance (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). 
In addition to shared mental models, there is a growing literature on recognition 
of expertise, and its importance to group effectiveness (Baumann & Bonner, 2013; 
Bonner, 2004; Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). A substantive collection of literature also 
exists examining other important group process variables such as backup behaviors and 
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mutual trust (Salas, Goodwin, & Burke, 2009). For purposes of this study, these 
processes will be classified as behavioral markers of coordination. 
Recognition of expertise refers to the process in which group members develop an 
understanding of the different knowledge bases and skill sets possessed by different 
group members (Ho & Wong, 2009). Backup behaviors are defined as “the ability to 
anticipate other team member’s needs through accurate knowledge about their 
responsibilities” (Salas et al., 2009). Over time, team members foster interaction and 
form expectations of one another’s behavior (Jones et al., 1999) which form the basis for 
the knowledge structures often referred to as shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, & Converse, 1993). Basketball teams are one example of team structures in which 
shared mental models among members govern coordination (i.e. mutuality and 
awareness) when overt communication is difficult (Gershgoren, 2013; Bourbousson, 
Poizat, Saury, & Seve, 2010). 
 
Collaboration, Coordination, and Familial Relationships 
 
Early in life, family interactions present individuals with their first opportunities 
to engage in collaboration and coordination. Thus, the family unit may be thought of as 
the first group where most individuals learn collaboration and coordination. 
Two studies suggest that coordination is more effective among family members 
compared to non-family members. One study (Segal, McGuire, Miller, & Havlena, 2008) 
compared tacit coordination (coordination when communication is not possible) 
displayed by twin siblings with that of non-related pairs of individuals. It was 
hypothesized that twin siblings would exhibit more effective tacit communication based 
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on the “greater resemblance in mental abilities, information processing strategies, and 
temperamental dispositions.” The findings were consistent with the hypothesis: 
monozygotic twins showed greater coordination than did either dizygotic twins or other 
matched pairs (Segal et al., 2008). 
Family members may also be more aware of one another’s strengths and 
weaknesses in performing a group task (recognition of expertise). For example, a study 
on family firms in China suggests that guanxi, a type of social capital related to familial 
relations, is associated with easier transfer of tacit knowledge (Su & Carney, 2013).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the existing literature, it is reasonable to suspect that familial 
relationships in teams will lead to better –rather than worse team performance. In the 
current study, college basketball teams will be used for hypothesis testing. There are 
known familial relationships in basketball teams which allow for testing the effects of 
familial relationships on team performance. In addition, the effect of the different types 
of familial relationships will be tested in an exploratory manner. The following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Team performance is expected to be positively related to the 
presence of familial relationships in teams. 
Hypothesis 2: Team processes are expected to be positively related the presence 
of familial relationships in teams. 
Hypothesis 3: Team processes are expected to mediate the relationship between 
familial relationships in teams and team performance. 
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METHODS 
 
Overview 
 
Based on the definition of teams offered above (Jones et al., 1999), college 
basketball is a team sport. To test the hypotheses, archival data were gathered from 
performance records of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) DI men’s 
basketball teams. These data included performance metrics, records of familial 
relationships on teams, and team process measures, all of which will be described in 
greater detail below. 
 
Measures 
 
Team performance will be assessed using Win/Loss Percentage, NCAA 
Tournament Berths, Final Four Appearances, and National Championship Wins. 
The documented team-family relationships all consist of fathers, sons, and 
brothers. These relationships were analyzed in two ways. First, an overall analysis of 
familial relationships (regardless of type) was used. Familial relationships were measured 
by frequency (i.e. two family members = one relationship, three family members = three 
relationships). Relationships among players, among coaching staff, and between players 
and coaching staff were all included in this variable. Separate analyses were also 
conducted on these familial relationship types, coded as Coach-Coach, Player-Player, and 
Coach-Player. 
Self-report measures of recognition of expertise, shared mental models, and back-
up behaviors are unavailable in this archival dataset. However, there are certain metrics 
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that may be indicative of some of these group processes. For instance, Assist/Turnover 
Ratio and Offensive Rebound Percentage may represent recognition of expertise on 
offense. An assist is recorded when a player completes a pass to another player who 
scores shortly after. A turnover is recorded when a player's action grants the opposing 
team a possession (via rule violation, passing the ball to an opponent, etc.). 
Assist/Turnover Ratio is calculated by dividing the team's total number of assists by their 
total number of turnovers. As players spend more time interacting, they become more 
familiar with the strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies of each other. This recognition of 
expertise (i.e. coordination) is expected to theoretically lead to more complete passes 
(leading to scores) and less incomplete passes (leading to turnovers), as individuals more 
accurately predict each other's behavior (e.g. spacing, movement, speed, and preferred 
shooting area). Ideally, passing turnovers would be used instead of general turnovers 
(which include rule violations) but this metric was unavailable. 
Recognition of expertise was also assessed using Offensive Rebound Percentage. 
An offensive rebound is recorded when a player takes possession of the ball after a shot is 
missed by a member of his own team. A defensive rebound is recorded when a player 
takes possession of the ball after a shot is missed by a member of the opposing team. Part 
of securing a rebound is anticipating not only whether a shot will be missed but also how 
a shot will be missed (e.g. the trajectory the ball might take after it bounces off the rim), 
which is often a function of the shot's characteristics (e.g. distance and arc). For example, 
a missed shot attempted from a greater distance will often bounce off the rim with more 
force and will take a faster trajectory. Similarly, a missed shot attempted with more arc 
(height of the ball's parabola vertex) will often bounce off the rim with more force and 
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will take on a trajectory with more height. Over time, team members are expected to 
more accurately predict the rebound trajectory of the shots their team members miss 
based on the shooter's tendencies.  
In addition, Steals and Blocks are used as indicators of backup behaviors. A steal 
is recorded when a defensive player takes possession of the ball from an offensive player 
(not as a result of a rule violation). A block is recorded when a defensive player deflects 
the shot attempt of an offensive player. Defensive players often record blocks while 
assisting team members (backup behaviors) who are in disadvantageous positions. For 
example, a team member who lets an offensive player get too close to the rim will often 
be helped by a fellow team member, who may be able to block the offensive player's 
shot. Similarly, defensive players often record steals when they provide defensive support 
for fellow team members. Ideally, cross-positional steals and cross-positional blocks 
would be analyzed, but these metrics were unavailable.  
Like backup behaviors, shared mental models may be represented by behaviors on 
defense. An example of a shared mental model is a shared defensive plan among players. 
This was assessed using Opponent Points as an index. Opponent Points refers to the 
number of points an opposing team scores. Team members typically share a mental 
model of defense which guides behavior. For example, in some defensive models, each 
defensive player is responsible for defending an offensive player. In other defensive 
models, each defensive player is responsible for defending a specific area of the court, 
and whichever offensive player occupies that area. Defensive models also dictate how 
defensive players will react to certain situations, such as specific offensive plays, or 
movements by specific players. Theoretically, the more effective defensive models will 
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lead to fewer points scored by the opposing team. Since familial relationships are thought 
to lead to greater coordination, they should be negatively related to Opponent Points. 
Initially, Points Differential (Opponent Points subtracted from the number of 
scored points) was used as the shared mental model index, in order to control for the 
effect of the game pace (i.e. a faster pace leads to more possessions for the opposing team 
and thus, more opportunities to score). However, Points Differential was found to have a 
collinear relationship with Win/Loss Percentage, r(322) = .98, p< .001 and was excluded 
from further analysis. The following model (Figure 1) summarizes the measures used in 
this study: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Measures of familial relationships, process, and performance 
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Samples 
Records of documented familial relationships between players and coaches were 
obtained from the NCAA, and were used as a starting point for data collection. Online 
sources (e.g. sports-reference.com, Wikipedia, team websites) were used to verify data 
and search for other familial relationships within teams. From 1925 to 2015, 499 
documented familial relationships were found. The average number of familial 
relationships per season was calculated for the analyses. Team performance data were 
obtained from NCAA Men’s DI Basketball archives and sports-reference.com archives.  
However, not all metrics were available for the same time period. The dataset was 
grouped into two subsets. The first subset includes all available data, and the second 
subset spans two different time periods. Two additional time periods (1997 to 2015 and 
2002 to 2015) were excluded. Results from these time periods mirrored results from 
Sample C.  
The first sample (Sample A) is comprised of 477 teams. This sample includes 
performance metrics (e.g. Win/Loss Percentage, NCAA Tournament Berths, Final Four 
Appearances, and National Championships) from seasons 1893 to 2015. This sample also 
includes any team with at least one NCAA DI season recorded. There are 499 
documented familial relationships from 1925 to 2015 in this sample, which represents all 
of the family relationships found.  
The second sample is comprised of 324 teams across two different time periods 
(Sample B and Sample C). Sample B includes seasons ranging from 1960 to 2015. This 
time period was selected in order to reduce the potential effect of non-random missing 
data (e.g. lack of reporting familial relationships during earlier seasons). Using this time 
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period, 91.7% of the documented familial relationships were retained. After excluding 
any teams whose only active seasons ranged from 1893 to 1959, two selection criteria 
were used for the remaining sample: teams still active (as of 2015) and teams with at least 
10 active seasons between 1960 to 2015. With these criteria applied, the selected sample 
is comprised of 324 teams with 447 family relationships. Win/Loss Percentage from 
seasons 1960 to 2015 was the only performance metric used for this sample. 
Sample C was used to analyze both team performance and team process metrics 
and is comprised of the same 324 teams used in the Sample B. Sample C spanned seasons 
ranging from 2010 to 2015 with 67 documented family relationships, and includes the 
following measures: Opponent Points, Steals, Blocks, Assist/Turnover Ratio, and 
Offensive Rebound Percentage. Table 1 describes the characteristics of each sample. 
 
 
Table 1. Variable details of each sample 
Sample  Teams Seasons 
Included 
Family  
Relationships 
Team Performance and  
Team Process Metrics 
A 477 1893 - 2015 499  Win/Loss Percentage 
 NCAA Tournament Berths 
 Final Four Appearances 
 National Championships 
B 324 1960 - 2015 447  Win/Loss Percentage 
C 324 2010 - 2015 67  Win/Loss Percentage 
 Opponent Points 
 Steals 
 Blocks 
 Assist/Turnover Ratio 
 Offensive Rebounds 
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RESULTS 
 
Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS (Version 22). Descriptive 
statistics and correlations for Sample A, Sample B, and Sample C are described in Tables 
2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
Hypothesis 1 was tested using all metrics from Samples A and B, and Win/Loss 
percentage from Sample C. Results generally support Hypothesis 1. Significant, positive 
correlations were found between familial relationships and five performance metrics. 
MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of familial relationships on performance in 
Sample A, Wilks’ λ= .04, F(360, 1210) = 4.39, p< .001, ηp
2= .57. 
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Coach relationships 
and two performance metrics (NCAA Tournament Berths and Final Four Appearances). 
MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of Coach-Coach relationships on a 
composite of metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.68, F(52, 1470) = 2.94, p< .001, ηp
2= .09.  
Player-Player relationships were most strongly related to better team performance. 
Significant, positive correlations were found between Player-Player relationships and five 
performance metrics. MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of Player-Player 
relationships on a composite of team performance metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.07, 
F(216, 1352) = 5.84, p< .001, ηp
2= .48.  
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Player relationships 
and two performance metrics (Win/Loss Percentage in Sample B and C). MANOVA 
results suggest a significant effect of Coach-Player relationships on a composite of 
performance metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.16, F(196, 1372) = 4.02, p< .001, ηp
2= .36.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample A) 
   Correlations 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Fam. Relations 1.05 2.91 1        
2 Coach-Coach 0.19 1.42 .39** 1       
3 Player-Player 0.36 1.14 .31** .07 1      
4 Coach-Player 0.49 1.57 .92** .09* .05 1     
5 Win/Loss  0.55 0.14 −.04 .03 .01 −.05 1    
6 Tournaments 7.76 9.73 .11* .14** .27** .00 .61** 1   
7 Final Four 0.78 2.33 .13** .11* .27** .04 .45** .63** 1  
8 Championships 0.19 0.91 .13** .08 .27** .05 .33** .48** .84** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample B)  
 
 Correlations 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Fam. Relations 1.40 3.31 1     
2 Coach-Coach 0.29 1.71 .74** 1    
3 Player-Player 0.47 1.26 .46** .01 1   
4 Coach-Player 0.65 1.77 .81** .37** .16** 1  
5 Win/Loss  0.55 0.09 .24** .08 .21** .23** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample C)  
 
   Correlations   
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Fam. Relations 0.21 0.96 1          
2 Coach-Coach 0.01 0.11 .11 1         
3 Player-Player 0.08 0.54 .75** −.01 1        
4 Coach-Player 0.12 0.65 .84** −.01 .29** 1       
5 Win/Loss 0.52 0.13 .21** .06 .20** .13* 1      
6 Opp. Points 68 3.68 −.09 −.03 −.07 −.08 −.59** 1     
7 Steals 6.48 0.84 .03 .00 .05 .01 .14* .08 1    
8 Blocks 3.50 0.81 .12* .00 .15** .05 .38** −.15** .21** 1   
9 Assist/TO  0.99 0.15 .20** .01 .17** .16** .70** −.37** −.07 .15** 1  
10 Off. Rebound 0.32 0.03 −.03 −.06 −.01 −.02 −.11 −.11 .44** .21** −.32** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Significant, positive correlations were 
found between familial relationships and two process metrics (Blocks and 
Assist/Turnover Ratio). MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of familial 
relationships on the two process metrics tested, Wilks’ λ=.77, F(46, 598) = 1.84, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .12. No significant correlations were found between Coach-Coach relationships and 
any of the process metrics. 
Significant, positive correlations were found between Player-Player relationships 
and two process metrics (Blocks and Assist/Turnover Ratio). MANOVA results suggest a 
significant effect of Player-Player relationships on the two process metrics tested, Wilks’ 
λ=.84, F(20, 624) = 2.91, p< .001, ηp
2 = .09.  
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Player relationships 
and only one process metric (Assist/Turnover Ratio). Table 4 presents the correlation 
statistics for each of these relationships. 
Results from correlation analyses support the predicted link between familial 
relationships and team performance in Hypothesis, as well as the link between familial 
relationships and two of the five team process metrics (Blocks and Assist/Turnover 
Ratio) in Hypothesis 2. However, the correlation analyses used the average number of 
familial relationship per season, and so the problem of potential aggregation exists. 
Supplementary analyses were conducted using Sample C in an attempt to sidestep this 
problem. For these analyses, metrics were chosen based on the results of the correlation 
analyses. Team performance was assessed using Win/Loss Percentage, and team 
processes were assessed using Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks. 
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First, a paired sample t-test was conducted using Sample C, which ranged from 
2010 to 2015 with 67 familial relationships across 23 teams. For each team, the metrics 
were averaged for the seasons in which familial relationships were present and compared 
to the seasons in which no familial relationships were present. Results did not support 
Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2, as no significant mean differences were found in 
performance (Win/Loss Percentage) or process (Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks) 
metrics using this grouping. Table 5 presents the results from the paired sample analysis.  
 
 
Table 5. Paired sample t-test statistics for familial vs. non familial seasons 
 
 Familial 
Relationships 
No Familial 
Relationships 
    
 M SD M SD t df d p 
Win/Loss Percentage 0.63 0.15 0.59 0.16 0.99 22 .26 .33 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 1.1 0.18 1.1 0.18 −0.30 22 .00 .77 
Blocks 4.0 1.16 3.9 1.16 1.0 22 .09 .32 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
A weakness of the paired sample t-test was that only 23 teams were analyzed. 
Data from 301 other teams were included in Sample C but could not be used in the paired 
sample analysis because there were no documented familial relationships in these teams 
for this time period. To determine whether further analyses were appropriate, the 
performance and process metrics were averaged for all the seasons in which familial 
relationships were present (i.e. the seasons of the 23 teams used in the paired sample 
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analysis) and compared to all the seasons in which no familial relationships were present 
(i.e. remaining seasons from all 324 teams in Sample C). To test the differences between 
the two groups, a MANOVA was conducted with Win/Loss Percentage, Assist/Turnover 
Ratio, and Blocks entered simultaneously. Results suggest a significant effect of familial 
relationships on all three metrics, Wilks’ λ=.95, F(3, 343) = 5.89, p = .001, ηp
2= .05. 
Table 6 summarizes the effect of familial relationships on each metric. 
 
 
Table 6. MANOVA summary for familial vs. non familial relationships  
 
Dependent Variable df F p ηp
2 
Win/Loss Percentage 1 15.35 < .001** .04 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 1 7.11 .008** .02 
Blocks 1 7.95 .005** .02 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Based on the results from the MANOVA, it was appropriate to examine the effect 
of familial relationships on each metric using independent sample t-tests for each 
comparison. Results suggest that teams with familial relationships record better Win/Loss 
Percentages, Assist/Turnover Ratios, and a higher number of Blocks compared to teams 
with no familial relationships. These results add support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2. Table 7 summarizes the descriptive statistics and group comparisons. 
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Table 7. Summary of independent sample t-tests 
 
 Familial  
Relationships 
No Familial  
Relationships 
    
 N M SD N M SD t df d p 
Win/Loss Percentage 23 0.63 0.15 324 0.51 0.13 3.92 345 .91 < .001** 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 23 1.1 0.18 324 0.99 0.16 2.67 345 .68 .008** 
Blocks  23 4.0 1.16 324 3.5 0.82 2.82 345 .59 .005** 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
To more effectively combat the aggregation problem, the next analysis did not use 
averages. Instead, each team in a specific year was analyzed as a distinct team (e.g. Duke 
from 2010 to 2015 = 6 distinct teams). Using Sample C, the 67 documented familial 
relationships (coded as a dichotomy - Familial Relationships/No Familial Relationships) 
were mapped onto 1940 distinct teams. MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of 
familial relationships on all three metrics tested (Win/Loss Percentage, Assist/Turnover 
Ratio and Blocks), Wilks’ λ=.98, F(3, 1936) = 13.87, p< .001, ηp
2 = .02. Table 8 
summarizes the MANOVA results.  
Based on the MANOVA results, it was appropriate to further examine the effect 
of familial relationships on each of the individual metrics using independent sample t-
tests for each comparison. Results add support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Table 
9 summarizes the descriptive statistics and comparisons between groups.  
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Table 8. MANOVA summary for non-aggregated metrics 
 
Dependent Variable df F p ηp
2 
Win/Loss Percentage 1 35.14 < .001** .02 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 1 24.19 < .001** .01 
Blocks 1 12.06    .001** .01 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 9. Summary of independent sample t-tests for distinct teams 
 
 Familial  
Relationships 
No Familial  
Relationships 
    
 N M SD N M SD t df d p 
Win/Loss Percentage 55 0.65 0.17 1885 0.51 0.17 5.93 1938 .82 < .001** 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 55 1.13 0.24 1885 0.99 0.20 4.92 1938 .70 < .001** 
Blocks 55 4.0 1.24 1885 3.48 1.09 3.47 1938 .48    .001** 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Team performance (Win/Loss Percentage) and team process (Assist/Turnover 
Ratio and Blocks) metrics were also analyzed across familial relationship types (i.e. 
Coach-Coach, Player-Player, and Coach-Player) in an exploratory manner. The 67 
documented  familial relationships were mapped onto each of the 1940 distinct teams in 
Sample C based on relationship type. Of the 67 documented familial relationships, 18 
were Player-Player relationships, 34 were Coach-Player relationships, and only two were 
Coach-Coach relationships. Coach-Coach relationships were excluded from analyses. 
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MANOVA results showed a significant main effect of relationship type on team 
performance and team process metrics, Wilks’ λ=.75, F(3, 48) = 5.37, p = .003, ηp
2 = .25. 
An analysis of the effect of familial relationships on each individual metric revealed a 
significant difference for Win/Loss Percentage and Blocks, but not Assist/Turnover 
Ratio. Table 10 summarizes the MANOVA results. 
 
 
Table 10. MANOVA summary for player-player vs. coach-player relationships  
 
Dependent Variable df F p ηp
2 
Win/Loss Percentage 1 6.75 .01** .12 
Assist/Turnover Ratio 1 0.01 .93 .00 
Blocks 1 7.73  .008** .13 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Based on the MANOVA results, it was appropriate to examine the effect of 
familial relationship type on each metric (Win/Loss Percentage and Blocks) using 
independent sample t-tests. Compared with teams with Coach-Player relationships, teams 
with Player-Player relationships report higher levels of team performance (i.e. better 
Win/Loss Percentage) and team process metrics (i.e. more Blocks). Table 11 summarizes 
the descriptive statistics and comparisons between relationship types.  
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Table 11. Summary of t-tests for distinct teams across relationship types 
 
 Player-Player 
Relationships 
Coach-Player 
Relationships 
    
 N M SD N M SD t df d p 
Win/Loss Percentage 18 0.73 0.14 34 0.61 0.18 2.60 50 .72    .012* 
Blocks  18 4.74 1.33 34 3.79 1.07 2.78 50 .82    .008** 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Based on the results from Hypothesis 2, Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks were 
used to test the mediation effect predicted by Hypothesis 3. Mediation analyses were 
conducted using the PROCESS (Version 2.15) macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). The conceptual model is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model of mediation effect 
 
 
 
Familial 
Relationships 
(X) 
Assist/ 
Turnover 
Ratio (M1) 
Blocks 
(M2) 
Win/Loss 
Percentage 
(Y) 
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Assist/Turnover Ratio was entered into the model first as it was more highly 
correlated with Familial Relationships (compared with Blocks). Results suggest that full 
mediation was found. After controlling for Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks, Win/Loss 
Percentage no longer significantly correlated with Familial Relationships. The mediation 
analysis is summarized in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 12. Model summaries for mediation analysis 
 
Predictor  
(X) 
Outcome 
(Y) 
Control 
(M1) 
Control 
(M2) 
b SE p R2 
Familial 
Relationships 
Assist/ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
 
  6.72 1.81 < .001** .04 
Familial 
Relationships 
Blocks Assist/ 
Turnover  
Ratio 
 
 16.75 9.90 .092 .03 
Familial 
Relationships 
Win/Loss 
Percentage 
Assist/ 
Turnover  
Ratio 
Blocks 
1.22 1.05 .25 .57 
**. Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
The relationship between familial relationships and team performance runs 
counter to the logic of anti-nepotism policies. Results of this study showed that on 
average, teams with familial relationships performed better than teams with no familial 
relationships. Consistent with previous research, more effective coordination is believed 
to be a key aspect of the superior performance outcomes. Thus, for teams whose task 
work relies at least partly on coordination, the familiarity that comes with familial 
relationships is expected to enhance team performance. The findings may be applied to 
live-action teams such as medical teams, military teams, emergency rescue teams, and 
perhaps spaceflight teams. This presents organizational decision makers with important 
information to consider when formulating nepotism policies.  
Like most focused examinations, results also showed this relationship is more 
complex than it appears. Different types of familial relationships had different apparent 
effects on team processes. Player-Player relationships had the strongest link to better 
team performance, and were most strongly associated with more effective coordination 
(i.e. backup behaviors and recognition of expertise). In retrospect, this seems obvious, as 
coordination processes are presumably more salient for Player-Player relationships (i.e. 
individuals performing task work). Coaches do communicate, share information, and 
plan; but these processes are distinct from coordination, at least in a live, skill-based 
behavioral sense. Thus, organizational decision makers may want to consider factors such 
as team composition, task work, and skill requirements when formulating policies 
regarding the hiring of family members.  
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Limitations 
 
Although a major strength of the study was analyzing a dataset that represented 
the entire population, there were also several limitations. Perhaps the most apparent is the 
all-male college-aged sample, which makes generalization to other kinds of teams in 
employment settings problematic. Potential under-reporting of familial relationships also 
poses a problem. If the actual number of family relationships in teams was greater than 
the relatively low base rate in this data, then the family - performance relationship may 
have been underestimated. This seems likely given the potential number of cousins on 
teams, for example. The overall effect of this might have been to attenuate, given 
restriction of range on the (familial relationship) predictor. Another limitation relates to 
statistical analyses conducted. Although these data came from a considerable time period, 
we did not have data that lent itself easily to longitudinal analyses. In particular, low base 
rates of the primary predictor variable (familial relationships) made corrections for auto-
correlation difficult. Time-series effects would have provided for some cause-effect 
inferences.  
 
Future Research 
 
Future research on his topic may consider obtaining non-archival data from 
different types of teams and settings using analyses that will allow for cause and effect 
inferences. It may also be of interest to more directly measure team coordination 
processes, such as back up behaviors and recognition of expertise, in order to further 
understand the inner workings of these relationships.  
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